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The evolution of cooperation requires somemechanism that reduces the risk of exploitation for cooperative
individuals. Recent studies have shown that men with wide faces are anti-social, and they are perceived that
way by others. This suggests that people could use facial width to identify anti-social men and thus limit the
risk of exploitation. To see if people can make accurate inferences like this, we conducted a two-part
experiment. First, males played a sequential social dilemma, andwe took photographs of their faces. Second,
raters then viewed these photographs and guessed how second movers behaved. Raters achieved significant
accuracy by guessing that second movers exhibited reciprocal behaviour. Raters were not able to use the
photographs to further improve accuracy. Indeed, some raters used the photographs to their detriment; they
could have potentially achieved greater accuracy and earned more money by ignoring the photographs and
assuming all second movers reciprocate.
T
he evolution of cooperation is a difficult and controversial puzzle because a cooperative individual pays a
personal cost to produce benefits for others1–4. This renders the cooperator vulnerable to exploitation by
selfish types who take advantage of these benefits without cooperating themselves. The result is a potential
selective disadvantage for those who cooperate. In spite of this general theoretical point, humans often do
cooperate. In particular, we do so with unrelated individuals in one-shot interactions, and this especially strong
form of altruistic cooperation seems to distinguish us from closely related species3–9.
A number of theories can explain the evolution of cooperation3,10, including the altruistic variants of coopera-
tion that characterize human social behavior4. These theories differ enormously in terms of the precise mechan-
isms involved, and disagreements over which mechanisms are important lie at the root of the persistent
controversy about the evolution of human pro-social behavior3,10,11. Regardless, candidate mechanisms share
the feature that they somehow produce positive assortment, which we can broadly define as an outcome in which
defectors are at least partially excluded from the benefits produced by cooperation3,4. In general, to the extent that
somemechanism directs the benefits produced by cooperation toward others who also cooperate, themechanism
limits the risk of exploitation. It thus attenuates or even reverses the selective disadvantage associated with
cooperating.
Generating assortment would be straightforward if individuals could quickly identify each other by type. A
mechanism of this kind would be particularly useful in interactions with unfamiliar individuals where informa-
tion about one’s partner is limited. One version of such a mechanism is the green-beard effect1–3. As originally
formulated, green beards work in the following way. A single allele produces both an observable trait, namely the
metaphorical green beard, and a behavioural tendency to recognize and cooperate with others having the same
observable trait. The green beard, whatever it is in practice, renders the presence of a shared allele observable, and
so individuals with the allele can find each other and enjoy the benefits of mutual cooperation while limiting the
risk of exploitation.
Green beards represent an interesting theoretical possibility because they aptly illustrate the importance of
assortment for the evolution of cooperation. As a specific mechanism, however, they have a serious problem2,3. To
work effectively, green beards require a strong and stable association between the observable trait and the
unobservable presence of a specific allele. If we admit the possibility of a rare mutant who has the observable
trait but not the allele of interest, the system will unravel because cooperating given the presence of a green-
bearded partner makes one vulnerable to green-bearded defectors. We should thus not be surprised that, in the
nearly half century since the green-beard effect was first suggested, only a few possible examples involving ants12,
amoebas13, and yeast14 have been found.
Intriguingly, however, a number of recent studies have produced results suggesting that men could have
observable traits analogous to green beards. Specifically, these studies show that men with wide faces, adjusted
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for height, are more aggressive15,16, more prone to unethical beha-
vior17, and less trustworthy in social dilemmas18 than men with nar-
row faces. A relationship exists, in other words, between an
observable measure of facial structure and the tendency to behave
pro-socially or anti-socially. Facial width is analogous to a green
beard because it is an observable marker that reveals what is unob-
servable ex ante but nonetheless critically important, namely
the tendency to behave in a certain way in a specific type of social
interaction.
If one key relationship is the link, discussed immediately above,
between facial structure and actual behavioural tendencies, a second
key relationship is the link between facial structure and perceived
behavioural tendencies. At least two recent studies show that men
with wide faces are not only more aggressive and more selfish than
men with narrow faces, they are apparently perceived that way by
others16,18. Additional studies also show that people can use facial
characteristics to make accurate judgements about specific person-
ality traits in others19,20. Facial width, given these results, is not only a
marker of behavioural tendencies that are important but unobserva-
ble ex ante, it might also be used by others as a cue of such beha-
vioural tendencies. Again, facial width would be analogous to green
beards in this case. The original discussion of green beards posited
simply that green-bearded individuals cooperate with other green-
bearded individuals. More generally, however, we can think of green
beards as arbitrary conspicuous markers that, if reliable, can be used
by others as cues to reduce the statistical risk of exploitation in social
dilemmas via some kind of conditional behaviour. The critical con-
sideration is the reliability of the marker and, by extension, the accu-
racy of those who use the marker as a cue.
Reliability matters because without it the unobservable trait of
primary interest, a trait like the tendency to cooperate in social
dilemmas, is not really observable. Using the marker to generate
assortment with respect to this primary trait is thus impossible.
Even if the marker is reliable, however, it must also be appropriately
used as a cue by others. Indeed, assortment can only occur when
individuals use the observable trait to draw accurate inferences about
others and condition their behaviour accordingly. This is true if
accuracy is a rather figurative concept in which green-bearded coop-
erators follow a simple algorithm by cooperating categorically with
other green-bearded individuals. This is the original green-beard
effect, and accuracy in this case refers to the rate at which the
green-beard algorithm leads to mutual cooperation rather than
exploitation. The importance of accuracy also holds more generally
if an individual uses an observable trait to consciously estimate
whether she is facing another cooperator, and she then cooperates
if she concludes that she is. We will call this latter procedure ‘‘green-
bearded typecasting’’, and the inferential accuracy at the root of
green-bearded typecasting is the focus of this paper.
We focus on green-bearded typecasting instead of the original
green-beard mechanism for three reasons. First, in terms of actual
behaviour, it is the more general of the two ideas; the original green-
beard effect is behaviourally equivalent to a special case of typecast-
ing in which potential partners with a green beard are estimated to be
cooperators with probability 1. Second, green-bearded typecasting is
of special interest in humans because in many domains humans are
prone to typecast others about whom they know little21,22. Finally, in
terms of observable behaviour, the original green-beard algorithm
conflates preferences over outcomes with beliefs about the likely
behaviour of one’s partner. Assume, for example, that we observe a
focal individual with a green beard cooperating with another green-
bearded individual. On the one hand, the focal individual might
cooperate because she has preferences that make her unconditionally
generous toward green-bearded partners. This explanation depends
exclusively on the focal individual’s preferences regarding people
with green beards. On the other hand, the focal individual might
want to cooperate with any person she believes is also willing to
cooperate, and the presence of a green beard simply affects her beliefs
about this all-important question. Both mechanisms are interesting
and important possibilities, but for the sake of analytical clarity we
focus on the beliefs-based component of the latter possibility. To
isolate effects associated with beliefs, we asked independent raters,
in effect, to typecast but not to interact with others for whom we had
behavioural data from a social dilemma game. The critical task is to
determine if typecasting is accurate. Recent empirical results15–20
suggest it could be, while the theoretical vulnerabilities of green
beards2,3 suggest it should not be.
To address the question of accuracy, we conducted a study invol-
ving two tasks (see Methods and Supplementary Information, SI).
The first task was a behavioural experiment conducted in Munich,
Germany, with male participants. The game played in this experi-
ment was a sequential social dilemma, specifically a modified trust
game23. In this game, first movers could either transfer their entire
endowment of nine Euros to second movers, with associated effi-
ciency gains, or they could transfer nothing at all. Consequently, each
first mover faced a binary choice; he could either trust his partner or
not. After learning which of these choices a first mover made, the
second mover could back transfer any amount, in one-Euro incre-
ments, between zero and his endowment. Back transfers also brought
efficiency gains. The choices of second movers provided us with a
behavioural measure of their individual tendencies to exploit others.
The second task was implemented in Konstanz, Germany. In
Konstanz, independent raters viewed photographs of the second
movers in Munich. For each second mover, in addition to viewing
the photograph, raters also knew whether the associated first mover
trusted the second mover in the photograph. Given both the pho-
tograph of a second mover’s face and the transfer decision of the first
mover, raters made guesses about second mover back transfers. The
accuracy of these guesses is our principal but not exclusive concern.
Analyses discussed below also make use of the facial width-to-height
ratios and the attractiveness of second movers (SI).
Results
Raters viewed photos and guessed the choices of 54 second movers.
Of these 54 second movers, a total of 41 were trusted by their part-
ners. Given 28 raters, we have a total of 1512 observations to evaluate
accuracy. In some analyses below, we restrict attention to the 41
second movers who were trusted by their partners. These analyses
hold first-mover behaviour constant, and in that sense they isolate
the informational content of the photographs themselves. Given 41
second movers who were trusted, we have 1148 observations for
these analyses. We explain below as needed how we account statist-
ically for the fact that we have multiple observations per rater.
We first address the relationships between the back transfers in
Euros of second movers and their facial characteristics. We focus on
the 41 second movers who were trusted. These second movers are
especially important because they were the players in an explicit
position to exploit or reciprocate their partners’ trust. We use
ordered probit models for these analyses. We do so because second
mover back transfers were strongly bimodal, with many second
movers back transferring everything or nothing (Fig. 1). Ordered
probit models require that responses are ordered, but responses do
not need to be normally distributed. Moreover, the ordered probit
model is most appropriate when modelling, as in our case, dis-
crete behaviours that involve more than two options with an
ordinal though not necessarily cardinal relation to an underlying
set of preferences25.
For the 41 second movers who were in a position to exploit their
partners’ trust, we found no relationship between facial structure
and trustworthiness or between attractiveness and trustworthiness
(Fig. 1). In particular, using models with single independent vari-
ables, the estimated relationship between back transfers and facial
width-to-height ratios is not significant (ordered probit; estimate for
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 1 047 | DOI: 1 0.1 038/srep01 047 2
width/height is 0.897, P 5 0.472); nor is the relationship between
back transfers and attractiveness levels (ordered probit; estimate for
mean attractiveness is 20.126, P 5 0.706). These results mean that
neither the facial width nor the attractiveness levels of secondmovers
could have revealed anything about their tendencies to exploit or
reciprocate another’s trust.
The same conclusions follow from analysing the choices of all 54
second movers using a multivariate approach. Specifically, we con-
ducted two model selection exercises in which we modelled second
mover back transfers as a function of several independent variables in
various combinations (SI). The independent variables include the sec-
ond mover’s width-to-height ratio, the second mover’s attractiveness,
and a dummy variable indicating if the second mover was trusted by
his partner. We repeated this model selection exercise using two dif-
ferent approaches to the dependent variable. Specifically, we used (i)
ordered probit regressions in which we modelled second mover back
transfers in Euros, and we used (ii) simple probit regressions that
dichotomized second mover back transfers as zero or positive. We
focus on the ordered probit results because, as discussed above, the
ordered probit model provides an appropriate and thorough treat-
ment of second mover back transfers. The simple probit treatment,
however, is an important robustness check because it collapses all
second movers who back transferred a positive amount into a single
category. It thus provides a treatment of second mover choices that
maximises our ability to identify any systematic relationship between
our independent variables and pro-social choices, broadly defined, by
second movers. Although we present ordered probit results, we would
like to emphasize that our results and conclusions are entirely robust
across both treatments of the dependent variable.
Table 1 presents the set of ordered probit models and the results of
model selection based on an information theoretic criterion24. The
weight of evidence (Table 1,
P
i[ 1,3f g wi~0:999) shows that the key
independent variable is the dummy indicating whether a second
mover was trusted. The coefficient on this dummy is always, if
included in a specific regression (e.g. Table 2), positive and highly
significant (Table 2, estimate is 1.730, P, 0.001), whereas the coeffi-
cients on width-to-height ratios (e.g. Table 2, P5 0.680) and attrac-
tiveness levels (e.g. Table 2, P 5 0.826) are never significant at any
conventional level. This latter point is true if we control for first
mover behaviour by including it as an independent variable, or if
we restrict attention to the 41 second movers who were trusted
(ordered probit; estimate for width/height is 0.880, P5 0.690; estim-
ate for attractiveness is 20.119, P 5 0.720). In sum, second movers
whowere trusted reliably back transferredmore than those whowere
not trusted. Second mover back transfers, however, bore no signifi-
cant relation to facial width or attractiveness.
We next conducted a model selection exercise in which we mod-
elled rater guesses, in Euros, about second mover back transfers (SI).
The independent variables include the width-to-height ratio of the
second mover’s face, the attractiveness of the second mover, a
dummy indicating if the second mover was trusted, and the actual
back transfer of the second mover. The first three variables allow us
to identify information the raters may have used to make inferences
Figure 1 | Back transfers for the 41 second movers who were trusted. Back transfers are shown as a function of the width-to-height ratios of second
mover faces (a) and as a function of the mean attractiveness ratings for second movers (b). Attractiveness levels range from 1 for ‘‘very unattractive’’ to 5
for ‘‘very attractive’’, andmean attractiveness levels shown here are averages over 28 independent raters of attractiveness (SI). Ordered probit regressions
(Tables 1 and 2) provide no evidence for a relationship between back transfers and the facial structure or attractiveness of second movers.
Table 2 | Ordered probit results for model 1 from Table 1. The
intercepts reflect the back transfers that actually occurred.
Although model 1 is not the best model, it is the full model, and
conclusions are robust to model specification. For this reason, we
show model 1
Parameter Estimate Robust std. error z P
W/H 0.51 6 1 .2 52 0.41 0.680
Att. 20.070 0.31 4 20.2 2 0.82 6
Trusted 1 .730 0.393 4.40 ,0.001
Intercept 0/1 1 .981 2 .803
Intercept 1 /3 2 .1 03 2 .788
Intercept 3/5 2 .1 67 2 .792
Intercept 5/7 2 .2 31 2 .790
Intercept 7/8 2 .41 4 2 .788
Intercept 8/9 2 .474 2 .788
Table 1 | Model selection, ordered probit, back transfers of all 54
second movers. The independent variables include (i) the width-to-
height ratios of second mover faces, (ii) the attractiveness levels for
second movers, and (iii) a dummy indicating which second movers
were trusted. The final columns show the number of parameters
estimated, the AICc values, and the Akaike weights (wi). AICc is
an improved form of Akaike’s criterion2 4,36, and Akaike weights
rescale AICc values to show the proportional weight of evidence
for each model. In this case, because the total Akaike weight over
models 1 and 3 is 0.999, the exercise clearly shows that the trust
of the second mover’s partner is the critical independent variable
Model W/H Att. Trusted Parameters AICc wi
1 3 3 3 9 1 38.71 9 0.061
2 3 3 8 1 51 .791 ,0.001
3 3 7 1 33.2 68 0.938
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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about second mover behaviour. The fourth variable, namely the
actual back transfers of second movers, is included to capture the
accuracy of rater inferences. Specifically, if the model selection exer-
cise tells us that the actual back transfer is an important independent
variable, and if the estimated coefficient on this variable is positive
and significant, then rater guesses about back transfers were accurate
in the sense that they are significantly and positively related to actual
back transfers. Importantly, however, this kind of significant rela-
tionship could disappear when adding a variable that controls for the
information used by raters tomake their accurate guesses. By includ-
ing both the kinds of information raters might use and the actual
back transfers of second movers in our model selection exercise, we
can identify both any accuracy that exists and potentially the
information being used to generate it.
In addition, we repeated the same model selection exercise by
modelling rater guesses using simple probit regressions that treat
both back transfers and rater guesses as binary (i.e. zero or positive).
As above, this is an important robustness check because it collapses
second mover choices and rater guesses about these choices into two
simple categories. This allows us to test for any systematic relation-
ship between actual pro-social tendencies, broadly defined, and per-
ceived pro-social tendencies, also broadly defined. Our results and
conclusions are entirely robust under both types of model, and we
focus on the ordered probit treatment.
Raters apparently used first mover behaviour as well as the facial
width and attractiveness of second movers as cues. To see this,
Table 3 presents the set of ordered probit models fit to the data
and the associated results of model selection. Model selection shows
that the width-to-height ratios of second mover faces, the attractive-
ness levels of second movers, and first mover behaviours are all
important independent variables (Table 3,
P
i[ 1,5f g wi~0:905).
Raters guessed, withmarginal significance, that menwith wider faces
back transferred less than men with more narrow faces (Table 4,
estimate is -0.302, P5 0.070). They also guessed that more attractive
second movers back transferred more than less attractive second
movers (Table 4, estimate is 0.156, P5 0.001), and they guessed that
second movers who were trusted were significantly more likely to
back transfer large amounts than second movers who were not
trusted (Table 4, estimate is 1.438, P , 0.001). Importantly, actual
back transfers are significantly and positively related to guesses about
back transfers under somemodel specifications, but the model selec-
tion results together with results from specific regressions clearly
show that first mover behaviour mediates this effect.
For example, model 2 from Table 3 includes actual back transfers
as an independent variable, but it does not include the dummy indi-
cating if a second mover was trusted. The model selection criterion
clearly indicates that model 2 is a poorly fitting model relative to
other models under consideration (Table 3, Model 2, w2 , 0.001).
Nonetheless, the results from model 2 produce a highly significant
relation between actual back transfers and rater guesses about back
transfers (ordered probit; estimate for actual back transfer is 0.066,
P, 0.001). Model 1 is identical except that it adds the behaviour of
the first mover as a control. Because the difference in AICc values
between these two models is 229.091 (Table 3), model 1 represents a
truly enormous improvement24 in terms of model selection.
Moreover, model 1 results show a significant positive relation
between rater guesses and the trust of first movers (Table 4, estimate
is 1.438, P , 0.001). Importantly, however, under model 1 the rela-
tionship between rater guesses and actual back transfers is not sig-
nificant (Table 4, P 5 0.231), and this shows that it is specifically
information about first mover behaviour that is responsible for the
rater accuracy we identify here.
Altogether, these results indicate the following.We know from our
analyses above that second movers who were trusted back trans-
ferred more than those who were not trusted. This is reciprocity, a
force that commonly affects behaviour in social interactions26,27. If
raters knew that reciprocity would influence second movers, they
could have achieved some degree of accuracy by simply assuming
that second movers who were trusted would back transfer more than
those who were not. This reciprocity heuristic would have generated
accuracy that appears, when first mover behaviour is not included in
the regression, as a significant relationship between actual back
transfers and rater guesses. When controlling for first mover beha-
viour, however, the effect associatedwith actual back transfers should
disappear if raters could not or did not use any information other
than first mover behaviour to improve accuracy. In this case, the
dummy for first mover trust will pick up all the information used
by raters to effectively generate a significant degree of accuracy. This
is exactly what we find when we compare models 1 and 2 (Tables 3
and 4). Moreover, although we do not present detailed and largely
redundant regression results, an analogous conclusion holds when
we compare models 3 and 4 (Table 3). These findings indicate that
raters achieved some degree of accuracy over all 54 secondmovers by
assuming that at least some second movers reciprocated trust. Raters
were not, however, able to achieve any additional degree of accuracy
Table 4 | Ordered probit results for model 1 from Table 3. The
intercepts reflect the rater guesses that actually occurred.
Although model 1 is not the best model, it is the full model, and
conclusions are robust to model specification. For this reason, we
showmodel 1. To account for the fact that we have multiple guesses
per rater, we calculated robust standard errors by clustering on
rater25
Parameter Estimate
Robust std.
error z P
W/H 20.302 0.1 66 21 .81 0.070
Att. 0.1 56 0.047 3.31 0.001
Trusted 1 .438 0.2 02 7.1 1 ,0.001
BT 0.006 0.005 1 .2 0 0.2 31
Intercept 0/1 0.944 0.401
Intercept 1 /2 1 .02 8 0.394
Intercept 2 /3 1 .1 54 0.383
Intercept 3/4 1 .2 91 0.376
Intercept 4/5 1 .448 0.370
Intercept 5/6 1 .664 0.371
Intercept 6/7 1 .774 0.372
Intercept 7/8 1 .91 9 0.374
Intercept 8/9 1 .987 0.377
Table 3 | Model selection, ordered probit, rater guesses about
back transfers for all 54 second movers. The total number of obser-
vations is 1512. Independent variables include (i) the width-to-
height ratios of second mover faces, (ii) the attractiveness levels
for second movers, (iii) a dummy indicating which second movers
were trusted, and (iv) the actual back transfers of second movers.
The final columns show the number of parameters estimated, the
AICc values, and theAkaikeweights (wi). Becausemodels 1 and5
constitute over 90% of the total Akaike weight, model selection
clearly shows that width-to-height ratios, attractiveness levels, and
first mover behaviour are all important predictors of rater infer-
ences
Model W/H Att. Trusted BT Parameters AICc wi
1 3 3 3 3 1 3 4785.2 65 0.2 87
2 3 3 3 1 2 501 4.356 ,0.001
3 3 3 1 1 4789.968 0.02 7
4 3 1 0 502 2 .51 3 ,0.001
5 3 3 3 1 2 4783.730 0.61 8
6 3 3 1 1 51 05.1 60 ,0.001
7 3 1 0 4788.1 63 0.067
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by using the photographs of second movers. The significant coeffi-
cients for facial width and attractiveness reveal that raters did
respond to information in the photographs of second movers; they
just could not use the information to improve the accuracy of their
inferences. More generally, the lack of accuracy associated with the
41 second movers who were trusted shows that raters could not use
the information in the photographs to identify the second movers
who exploited their partners.
These results are based on regressions that model individual rater
guesses and correct for multiple guesses per rater by calculating
robust standard errors clustered on rater25. To verify the robustness
of our conclusions, we also analysed rater accuracy directly by using a
different approach. The results in this case confirm the lack of accu-
racy identified above, and they also suggest that some of the raters
may have actually used the photographs to their detriment.
For each second mover, we categorized his back transfer as either
zero or positive. We also categorized each rater’s guess about a back
transfer as zero or positive. We then calculated a simple binary vari-
able that measures the accuracy of each guess. A guess was accurate if
the back transfer and the guess were both positive or if both were zero.
Otherwise, the guess was inaccurate. Given this binary variable, we
tested accuracy at the individual level using binomial tests by rater. We
then corrected for multiple tests with a procedure28 that maximises
power. This is a generous definition of accuracy that ignores the
magnitudes of second mover back transfers and rater guesses and thus
maximises the potential to identify raters who accurately identified
second movers who made positive transfers of any kind. By this
definition, a single rater had an accuracy rate above chance (i.e. a null
of 0.5) when we restrict attention to the 41 second movers who were
trusted (SI, Table S1). Over all 54 second movers, eight raters had
accuracy rates above chance (SI, Table S2). Interestingly, however, 10
raters had an accuracy rate significantly lower than what they would
have achieved by simply assuming that second movers reciprocated
transfers of zero with back transfers of zero and positive transfers with
positive back transfers. With this simple reciprocity heuristic, the
number of correct binary guesses over all 54 second movers would
have been 39. 10 raters were significantly below this number, and none
of them were significantly above (SI, Table S2).
These results support our earlier analyses. They show that several
raters were able to use explicit information about first mover behaviour
to achieve some significant degree of accuracy when drawing inferences
about secondmover behaviour. A number of additional raters, however,
were significantly less accurate than they could have been had they
simply restricted attention to first mover behaviour and assumed that
second movers reciprocate. This reduced level of accuracy presumably
occurred because the raters in question were paying attention to
information in the photographs that they could not use effectively.
Importantly, we paid raters for accurate guesses (see Methods and
SI). Although our incentive scheme was not based on the binary mea-
sure of accuracy we have derived here, raters were paid more on average
for accurate guesses. Because so many raters had a binary accuracy rate
below that allowed by a simple reciprocity heuristic, simply ignoring the
photos and adhering to the heuristic might have allowed some raters to
improve their performance and earn more money.
Discussion
Our results show that some ratersmade accurate inferences about the
choices of second movers in a sequential social dilemma. They did so
by using information about first mover behaviour. Raters could not
on balance make accurate inferences by viewing photographs of
second mover faces. Although some raters apparently used both
the facial structure and attractiveness of second movers as cues,
our data suggest they did so, if anything, to their detriment.
Inferential accuracy has clear limits. The limits we found are entirely
consistent with the dynamical instability of green-bearded typecast-
ing, a dynamical instability that should militate against reliable mar-
kers of otherwise unobservable behavioural tendencies in social
dilemmas.
Though not immediately obvious, the limits to inferential accu-
racy we found are potentially consistent with recent empirical find-
ings on facial width in men. Recent findings have shown an
association between wide faces, aggression, and dishonesty15–17.
The social interactions in these studies were not experimental social
dilemmas in the game theoretic sense3,4. We, in contrast, used an
experimental game that is a social dilemma in this sense. Selection
for reliable markers of behavioural tendencies can vary across stra-
tegic domains, with selection yielding reliable markers in some
domains29,30 but not others2,3,31. As a consequence, the link between
aggression, dishonesty, and wide faces found in some studies could
be compatible with the absence of a link between defection and wide
faces in our study; the behavioural domains of the studies are differ-
ent. Furthermore, the association between wide faces and aggression
apparently does not hold in all populations32. Regardless, our specific
results on facial width and second mover behaviour are at odds with
one recent study showing that men with wide faces are relatively
untrustworthy in a trust game18. For the moment this latter incon-
sistency remains a puzzle. Importantly, however, this study did not
analyse the accuracy of rater inferences, and in this sense it addressed
a question different from our main concern here.
Our primary interest concerns the accuracy of inferences about
others in social dilemmas. We found accuracy associated with first
mover behaviour but not with second mover faces. Other studies, in
apparent contrast, have uncovered accurate inferences arising from
brief exposure to the mannerisms, expressions, and faces of
others16,33,34. We believe these differences with respect to our study
are easily explained. For example, one study16 identified an ability to
accurately infer how aggressive others are, but again aggression is not
the same as defection in a social dilemma. In domains more closely
related to our own, researchers have found accurate inferences with
respect to economic games similar to our trust game33,34. In one
case33, raters could accurately infer the choices of others in a prison-
er’s dilemma by viewing photographs taken at the moment a player
made her decision. Photographs taken at other times, as in our study,
did not lead to accurate inferences. Inferential accuracy based on
markers observed at the moment behaviour is revealed is completely
different from inferential accuracy based onmarkers observed before
behaviour is revealed. In the former case, the markers are necessarily
irrelevant in terms of the consequences that follow from the social
interaction; in the latter case, they may or may not be relevant
depending on what they reveal and how they are used by others.
In another study34, raters achieved some degree of accuracy when
guessing the choices of players in a dictator game, a game which
provides a simple measure of altruism. Importantly, this study used
20-second videos of the dictators. These videos presumably provided
much more information than the still photographs we used, and this
additional information could be responsible for the accuracy of the
raters. In any case, all of the studies on accuracy described here
analysed inferences aggregated over raters in some way. The accu-
racy they identified, consequently, shows us how social groups can
aggregate noisy information to yield accuracy that emerges at the
group level. An evolutionary approach, however, requires an indi-
vidual-level analysis insofar as selection in evolutionary systems is
often strongest at or below the level of the individual organism2.
Under individual selection, what matters with respect to selection
is accuracy as experienced by individuals. Average inferences, in
contrast, represent a group-level variable. Of particular importance,
average inferences have a degree of accuracy that is at least as good as
and typically better than the accuracy of individuals35. Thus, an ana-
lysis demonstrating the accuracy of inferences averaged over raters
shows that guesses are systematic in some way, but it does not guar-
antee that accuracy at the individual level is sufficient to be statist-
ically significant or evolutionarily meaningful.
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We did not find any accuracy at the individual level associated
with the use of photographs. To check any effects associated with
aggregation, we also correlated the accuracy of average guesses about
back transfers with actual back transfers. Over all 54 second movers,
the correlation is large and highly significant (Pearson’s product-
moment correlation, 0.512, P , 0.001). Over the 41 second movers
who were trusted, it is small and not significant (Pearson’s product-
moment correlation, 0.061, P 5 0.704). Aggregation, in our case,
does not generate accuracy that we cannot already detect at the
individual level. At the individual level, photos did not lead to accur-
ate inferences, while knowledge of first mover choices did. Although
our data do not allow us to draw precise conclusions about why
knowledge of first mover choices was important, we suspect it was
because secondmovers and raters had some common understanding
of reciprocity. Specifically, second movers who were trusted sent
back more to their partners, and at least some of the raters made
guesses reflecting the same pattern. Still photos did not lead to a
further improvement in accuracy. Importantly, other forms of con-
tact could. Short videos of a person34, for example, represent more
information than a still photo, but they still represent an intriguingly
small amount of information. In the end, we should consider a con-
tinuum of information that one person can have about another. At
one end of the continuum, we have only a brief glance at a person’s
face. At the other end of the continuum, we can imagine two people
who have known each other intimately for many years. Somewhere
along this continuum, inferences should become detectably accurate
at the individual level. The ultimate task, in terms of assortment in
social dilemmas, is to determine just how much information is
required. Our results suggest that truly cursory contact is not enough.
Because our methods, however, put us squarely at the low-information
end of the continuum, our results still leave considerable room for
accurate inferences based on relatively limited information.
Methods
We implemented a modified trust game with male participants in Munich. We
modified the standard trust game23 to maximise the potential to detect accurate
typecasting (SI). In particular, both the first mover and the second mover had
endowments of nine Euros. The first mover began the game by deciding whether to
transfer his entire endowment. Thismeans the first mover’s choice was unambiguous;
he either trusted the second mover or not, and so he was either in a position to be
exploited by the second mover or not. If the first mover transferred his endowment,
the transfer was doubled, leaving the second mover with 18 Euros plus his original
endowment of nine Euros.
After learning the first mover’s choice, the second mover could back transfer any
amount between zero and nine Euros in one-Euro increments. Back transfers were
also doubled. Importantly, because each second mover had an endowment, which is
not typical of trust games23, he could back transfer a positive amount even if not
trusted by his partner. As a result, all secondmovers had real choices to make because
their set of feasible actions did not depend on first mover behaviour. This feature
allowed us to identify the accuracy of inferences about second mover behaviour for
both second movers who were trusted and for the entire sample of second movers.
Moreover, because second movers could back transfer any amount between zero and
nine Euros, we were able to characterize accuracy in the different ways described in
the Results section. This, in turn, allowed us to check the robustness of our conclu-
sions by addressing accuracy under different operational definitions. Altogether, 67
pairs of men played the game. Raters, however, made guesses about the second
movers from 54 of these pairs. In particular, we wanted to homogenise the sample of
second movers in terms of age and ethnicity to avoid having to control for these
variables with only a few observations responsible for the variation present.We did so
in a strictly ex ante fashion before analysing any data from the trust game or con-
ducting any sessions with raters (SI).
For the second task in Konstanz, 13 women and 15men viewed photographs of the
secondmovers inMunich andmade guesses about their choices in the trust game. For
each second mover shown, we also informed the raters if the second mover in the
photo was trusted by his partner. The choices of both the players and the raters were
fully incentivized. In particular, each player received a payment based on both his own
choice and the choice of his partner. We paid raters for accurate guesses using a
scheme that ensured they would earn more money on average for accurate guesses,
but it also preserved the anonymity of choices made by individual players (SI). We
also conducted an additional session in Konstanz in which 15 women and 13 men
evaluated the attractiveness of the second movers (SI). We used these evaluations to
see if the actual behaviour of second movers or rater guesses about second mover
behaviour varied in relation to second mover attractiveness. Finally, we used the
photographs of second movers to measure the width-to-height ratios of their faces
(SI), and this allowed us to identify any relationships between facial width, actual
behaviour, and perceived behavioural tendencies.
Further methodological details associated with both parts of the study are available
in the Supplementary Information. Our study was approved by the Human Subjects
Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information
Technology at the University of Zurich and by the Office of Data Protection and
Privacy at the University of Munich (i.e. Datenschutzbeauftragte der Universita¨t
Mu¨nchen).
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